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Conference Reports
THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS LAW
OF THE SEA CONFERENCE:
THE CARACAS SESSION
AND ITS AFTERMATH*
ROSTER OF MEMBERS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND RELATIONS, as of January, 1975:
Robert B. Krueger, Los Angeles, California, Chairman; H. Gary Knight,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Rapporteur; Lewis Alexander, Kingston, Rhode
Island; R. R. Baxter, Cambridge, Massachusetts; Aaron Danzig, New
York, New York; Arthur H. Dean, New York, New York; Richard N.
Gardner, New York, New York; Margaret L. Gerstle, Washington, D.C.;
Louis Henkin, New York, New York; Ann Hollick, Washington, D.C.;
Phillip C. Jessup, Norfolk, Connecticut; John G. Laylin, Washington,
D.C.; Myres McDougal, New Haven, Connecticut; Benjamin Read,
Washington, D.C.; Charles S. Ryhne, Washington, D.C.; Louis B.
Sohn, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
NTRODUCTION. This is the second report of the Subcom-
mittee on International Law and Relations ("Subcommittee")
pursuant to a Ford Foundation grant to the American Society of
International Law. The grant supports activities of the Subcom-
mittee with respect to the international law of the sea negotiations
and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
("Conference"). The first report consisted of recommendations
for research prior to the first substantive session of the Conference.
As a result of those recommendations, three studies were prepared
and distributed during the Caracas session of the Conference.1
* This is the second report of the Subcommittee on International Law and
Relations of the Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea. The Committee,
established in 1972, is composed of private citizens appointed by the Chairman of
the National Security Council Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea to
"provide adequate representation of the diverse interests involved in the law of the
sea." Members of the Committee serve solely in an advisory capacity and the
views stated herein do not necessarily represent those of the United States Gov-
ernnent.
H. Gary Knight, The Potential Use of Reservations to International Agree-
ments Produced by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea;
Jon L. Jacobson, The United States and the Law of the Sea Conference:
Interim Resource Management Options; and Jonathan I. Charney, The
Equitable Sharing of Revenues from the Oceans.
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The present report is in three parts:
(1) A factual account of the proceedings at the Caracas ses-
sion of the Conference;
(2) A distillation of analyses provided by Subcommittee
members utilizing the above-mentioned grant funds
for the purpose of attending the Caracas session;
and
(3) Recommendations for intersessional research which the
Subcommittee members felt would be of value to
negotiators at the Geneva session which began
March 17, 1975.
I. FACTUAL ACCOUNT OF
THE CARACAS SESSION
A. Adoption of the Rules of Procedure
The rules of procedure had been scheduled for adoption at the
first session of the Conference held in New York from Decem-
ber 3-14, 1973. However, difficulties in the negotiations precluded
conclusion of the matter there, and only after intersessional nego-
tiations plus one week of work in Caracas were the rules of pro-
cedure finally adopted.2 The only substantial issues involved in
the adoption of the rules concerned implementation of the so-
called "gentleman's agreement" and the requisite majority for
substantive decision making at the Conference.
The General Assembly had approved the "gentleman's agree-
ment" at its 2169th meeting on November 16, 1973, its purpose
being to ensure that the Conference would exhaust all efforts at
reaching agreement on substantive matters by way of consensus
and that there should be no voting on such matters until all efforts
at consensus had been exhausted. This language was endorsed by
the Conference in the form of a statement by the President made
on June 27, 1974. 3 Its implementation in the chapter of the rules
concerning decision making presented some difficult negotiating
obstacles which were ultimately overcome largely through the
personal diplomacy of Conference President Hamilton Shirley
Amerasinghe (Sri Lanka). Since the principles embodied in rules
37 and 39 of the rules of procedure constitute a departure from
2 U.N. Docs. A/CONF.62/30 (1 July 1974); A/CONF.62/30/Rev. 1 (16
July 1974); and A/CONF.62/30/Rev. 2. For the summary records of the public
debates on rules of procedure, see U.N. Docs. A/CONF.62/SR.15-20 (21-27
June 1974).
3 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.19 (27 June 1974).
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past international conference practice, their contents will be briefly
summarized.
Rule 37 establishes the requirements for voting which, in
essence, constitute an implementation of the "gentleman's agree-
ment." Two types of deferrals of voting on substantive issues are
available, the first being a one-time only presidential option to
defer the question of taking a vote for up to 10 days (which defer-
ral is mandatory if requested by 15 representatives). The second
method of deferral, which may be used any number of times, re-
quires a proposal by the president or a motion by a representative,
the decision to be taken by a majority of the representatives pres-
ent and voting. When all deferment periods have been exhausted,
the Conference must then make a decision whether or not all ef-
forts to reach general agreement have been exhausted. This
decision is taken by the same majority required for decisions of the
Conference on matters of substance. If the decision is reached
that all efforts at general agreement have been exhausted, the
matter will then be put to a vote (after an automatic 2 day notice
period).4
The required majority for substantive decision is "a two-thirds
majority of the representatives present and voting, provided that
such majority shall include at least a majority of the States partici-
pating in that session of the Conference." This language was a
compromise between the views of those nations (predominately
the technologically advanced) which wished high voting majori-
ties in order to avoid tyranny by the majority and to ensure uni-
versal or near universal acceptance of the treaty ultimately
adopted, and those nations (principally developing countries)
which wished lower requisite majorities in order to make the most
effective use of their numbers, The compromise, an Australian-
Indian proposal, was adopted in lieu of either of these single for-
mula positions.5
B. Committee Structure and Allocation of Agenda Items
The Conference created a number of subsidiary bodies: (1)
three main committees to deal with the substantive issues, (2) a
4 Rules of Procedure, Rule 37, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/30 (2 July 1974).
5 Official registration figures showed 138 nations participating in the Caracas
session of the Conference. Thus, at least 70 affirmative votes would be required
to adopt a substantive treaty article, though 2/3 of the states present and voting at
a given meeting might be less than 70 [e.g., under the 2/3 quorum requirement,
substantive action could be taken with only 92 nations present; 2/3 of that number
is 62; but 62 votes would be insufficient to carry the point, for it is less than a
majority of states participating in the session (70)].
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general or "steering" committee, (3) a drafting committee (whose
duty was to formulate drafts and give advice on drafting as re-
quested, and to coordinate and refine the drafting of all texts re-
ferred to it), and (4) a credentials committee. Most significant
was the fact that the drafting committee did not meet until the
final week of the Conference and then commented that no drafts
had been submitted to it during the Caracas session. This, more
than any other single factor, was indicative of the lack of progress
toward a treaty during the Caracas session.
The three main committees were allocated agenda items from
the list of subjects and issues on the law of the sea constituting the
agenda for the Conference.6 The First Committee was given re-
sponsibility for seabed mining beyond the limits of national juris-
diction, the Second Committee for general law of the sea matters
(including the economic resource zone, the continental shelf, fish-
ing, and navigation), and the Third Committee for marine pollu-
tion and scientific research. All three main committees were
empowered to consider other issues insofar as relevant to the
specific items allocated.
C. Program of Work and Accomplishments
1. Plenary Sessions. For the first two weeks of the Confer-
ence, activity was concentrated exclusively in plenary sessions.
Opening ceremonies were held on June 20 and the period from
June 21 through June 27 was taken up with the adoption of the
rules of procedure (see above). On June 28 a general debate was
initiated which continued through July 15. During this time 115
nations and nine non-governmental organizations took the podium
to explain their views on the law of the sea.7 It was originally in-
tended that the general debate be limited to new participants (i.e.
those which had not been members of the United Nations Seabed
Committee) but it soon became obvious that a large majority of
nations at the Conference intended to express or reiterate their
positions on the major issues. Few significant changes in posi-
tion were made, however, the most interesting being the condi-
tional acceptance of the 200 mile economic resource zone concept
by the United Kingdom, 8 the Soviet Union,9 and the United
States.10
6 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/28 (20 June 1974).
7 U.N. Docs. A/CONF.62/SR.21-42 (28 June-15 July 1974).
1 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.29 (9 July 1974).
9 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.22 (28 June 1974).
10 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.38 (11 July 1974).
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After two weeks of general debate the three main committees
began informal efforts to develop their work programs which were
adopted for the First, Second, and Third Committees on July 10,
July 3, and July 11, respectively. Following general debate, the
plenary session met sporadically, primarily to hear progress reports
from the main committees and to engage in ceremonial activities."
The remainder of the work of the Conference took place in the
main committees or other groups.
2. First Committee. As noted above, the First Committee
adopted its program of work on July 10.12 This program envi-
sioned a week of general debate followed by a "third reading"
of the articles prepared by the Seabed Committee concerning the
legal regime for deep seabed mining. The work program was
left open-ended thereafter and ultimately developed around three
main issues: the economic implications of seabed mining; the
question of who might exploit the resources of the area beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction; and the conditions of exploita-
tion (i.e., the rules and regulations governing deep seabed mining).
The Chairman of the Committee, Paul Bamela Engo (Cam-
eroon) chaired the general debate sessions, while Christopher
Pinto (Sri Lanka) chaired the subsequent informal working ses-
sions which addressed the main issues identified above.
Very little substantive progress was made on the matters in
the First Committee.' 3 The third reading of draft articles for a
seabed mining regime resulted in very few changes and virtually
no reduction of the number of alternative texts representing the
various national and group positions. 14 Although the debates and
discussions on the various issues served to bring into sharper focus
the problems separating the various groups involved, little if any
progress was made toward compromising those positions. Thus
at the conclusion of the Caracas session, the issues remained about
as they were at its opening with respect to the major issues in
seabed mining. These issues and the principal positions thereon
may be summarized as follows.
The first issue is the question of "who may exploit the area."i5
11 U.N. Docs. A/CONF.62/SR.43 (22 July 1974) to end of session.
12 U.N. Doc, A/CONF.62/C.1/SR.1 (10 July 1974). For the Chairman's
statement of the work program, see U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.I/L.1 (10 July
1974).
13 For a summary statement of the work of the First Committee, see U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.I/L.10 (23 August 1974).
14 See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.3 (5 August 1974).
15 This issue is reflected in the four alternative treaty articles designated as
19761
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Technologically developed countries seek a nondiscriminatory
form of licensing similar to that used by the U.S. Department of
the Interior for allocating oil and gas leases on its continental
shelf. Proponents of such a view tend to visualize companies and
technologically developed nations as the only entities competent
to engage in the development of seabed resources. Developing
countries, however, perceive the same likelihood of domination of
this field by the technologically advanced nations as has occurred
in other areas and are thus seeking to limit the impact of corporate
technology. They insist that the seabed agency itself be granted
monopoly rights to exploit the area, though most recognize the
necessity for utilizing corporate technology in the near term under
joint ventures or negotiated contracts. Nonetheless, the agency
would be the dominant force and the developing nations would be
the controlling element of the agency in this approach.
The second issue relates to rules and regulations to govern
seabed mining. On the one hand, technologically developed na-
tions would like to see a detailed "mining code" written into the
treaty itself so that the entrepreneurs would know precisely the
content of rules for securing access to the resources as well as the
regulations which would govern conduct of their activities in the
ocean.16 Developing countries, on the other hand, seeking to give
the international seabed authority maximum flexibility to deal
with the corporate technologists, would prefer that only very general
guidelines be placed in the treaty with rules and regulations to be
adopted by the agency on an ad hoc basis after it comes into exis-
tence.17  Specific proposals on this subject were submitted
toward the close of the Caracas session by the United States,
Japan, the European Economic Community nations, and the
"Group of 77."18
The third major issue concerns the question of the economic
implications of seabed mining. If minerals such as manganese,
copper, cobalt, and nickel are extracted from manganese nodules
in substantial quantities, and if demand remains the same, a price
"Article 9" in the draft articles on the regime considered by the First Committee
[A/CONF.62/C.1/L.3 (5 August 1974)].
16 See, e.g., the proposals on this issue, submitted by the United States
[A/CONF.62/C.I/L.6 (13 August 1974)], the European Economic Community
countries [A/CONF.62/C.1/L.8 (16 August 1974)], and Japan
[A/CONF.62/C.1/L.9 (19 August 1974)].
17 See, e.g., the proposal submitted by the "Group of 77" [A/CONF.62/C.1/
L7 (16 August 1974)].
11 See supra notes 16 and 17.
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reduction could occur. If this happens, it would not be likely to
have adverse effects for diversified, complex economies, but
could have negative impacts on the economies of certain develop-
ing countries which are heavily dependent upon the exports of a
single commodity. In addition to a United Nations Secretariat
study on the topic, 9 the U.N. Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment has published a series of documents analyzing the specific
metals involved. 2D Industrial studies as well as a study by the
United States Department of State were also conducted over the
past three or four years. All of these studies, with the exception
of the UNCTAD reports, anticipate minor economic implications.
The UNCTAD studies, as well as a recent supplement to the U.N.
Secretariat study,21 which were introduced and distributed at
Caracas, indicate more serious consequences for the economies
of mineral exporting developing countries if seabed mining is per-
mitted to go unchecked. The issue has generated a great amount
of heat, but very little light.22  It boils down essentially to a
question of whose figures one believes. 23  In any event, the
developing countries have proposed that the seabed authority be
granted authority to limit production and to fix prices if necessary
in order to maintain the economies of developing nations, a sug-
gestion which most technologically developed nations regard as
anathema.
3. Second Committee. The second committee adopted its work
program on July 3, the earliest of any of the three main commit-
tees. 24  Chairman Andres Aguilar's (Venezuela) proposal, as
adopted, set the stage for the committee to entertain general de-
bate on each of the 15 agenda items assigned to the committee, 25
19 U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/36 (28 May 1971); see also the first supplement to
that study, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/73 (12 May 1972).
2 See UNCTAD Docs. Nos. TD/113/Supp. 4 (7 March 1972); TD/B/447
(18 June 1973); TD/B/449 (25 June 1973); TD/13/449/Add.1 (26 June 1973);
TD/B(XIII)/Misc.3 (31 July 1973); TD/B/483 (23 April 1974); TI)/B/483/
Add.1 (23 April 1974); and TD/B/484 (28 May 1974).
21 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/25 (22 May 1974).
22 For a summary of the relevant United Nations sponsored studies, see U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.2 (26 July 1974).
23 Compare, e.g., the working papers on the subject by the United States
[U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.5 (8 August 1974)] and Chile [U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.1/L.I1 (26 August 1974)].
24 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.1 (3 July 1974). For the Chairman's
statement of the work program, see U.N. Docs. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.2 (3 July
1974) and A/CONF.62/C.2/L.77 (23 August 1974).
2 U.N. Docs. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.2 (9 July 1974) to end of session.
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following each of which the officers of the committee would pre-
pare a working paper reflective of the main trends evidenced on
the particular issue under consideration. When the working pa-
pers were ready, whatever general debate was then underway was
interrupted for a consideration of the working paper which could
be put through as many as two revisions. The end product was a
series of 15 working papers each of which constituted, in draft
treaty article form, the major alternatives presented on each of
the substantive issues. During this process nearly 100 proposals
were submitted on the 15 agenda items. 26
Though this constituted essentially a preparatory exercise
rather than a negotiation of the differences involved, and thus could
be criticized for not providing any indication of progress in the
substantive negotiations, the enterprise was nonetheless completed
prior to the end of the session and provides the negotiators who will
assemble in Geneva in 1975 with a consolidated set of alternatives
in treaty form for their negotiating activities.2
Though it would not be appropriate in a summary report such
as this to discuss all of the issues involved in the work of the Second
Committee, the broad outlines of the major controversies can be
briefly indicated.
a. Economic Resource Zone. This concept, which would allo-
cate to coastal states exclusive jurisdiction over living and non-
living resources up to 200 miles from the baselines is strongly sup-
ported by developing coastal states. 27  Landlocked and other geo-
graphically disadvantaged nations are less enthusiastic about the
idea, unless appropriate access and resource/revenue sharing
provisions are included for their benefit. 28  Maritime powers,
with few exceptions, indicated a conditional willingness to accept
the notion, provided the treaty included guarantees for the conduct
of non-resource activities by nations other than the coastal state.
21 U.N. Docs. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.3-84 (3 July-26 August 1974).
26a For a summary statement of the work of the Second Committee, see
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.85 (28 August 1974).
27 For various proposals relating to the economic zone concept, see U.N.
Docs. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.5 (9 July 1974), L.17 (23 July 1974), L.21 (25 July
1974), L.21/Rev.1 (5 August 1974), L.32 (31 July 1974), L.38 (5 August 1974),
L.47 (8 August 1974), L.60 (14 August 1974), L.65 (16 August 1974), and L.82 (26
August 1974).
28 For proposals concerning the rights of landlocked and geographically dis-
advantaged states, see U.N. Docs. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.29 (30 July 1974), L.35
(1 August 1974), L.36 (5 August 1974), L.39 (8 August 1974), L.45 (8 August 1974),
and L.48 (8 August 1974).
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Developing nations want that "residual" authority for themselves,
while developed nations want non-allocated rights to fall within
the scope of the international community at large (to be developed
through subsequent agreement or emergence of customary law
rules). Specifically, the United States insisted that the 200 mile
economic zone concept would not be acceptable unless the obliga-
tions of coastal states to respect other uses of the area were spelled
out in detail in the treaty.
b. Fishing. Most developing coastal nations wish to have
exclusive jurisdiction over fishery resources within their economic
zone jurisdiction - i.e., foreign fishing would be permitted only at
the discretion of the coastal state. Distant water fishing states,
and other developed nations, argue that such coastal states should
be preferential only - i.e., the coastal state would be under an obliga-
tion to admit foreign fishing where the allowable catch was not
entirely taken by the coastal state. 29  Developing nations concede
the interest of neighboring states and neighboring landlocked
states, but resist the preferential concept for other nations on the
basis that it interferes with their "sovereignty" over natural re-
sources in the economic zone.
Controversy also exists over treatment to be afforded highly
migratory species and anadromous species. Developing coastal
states wish jurisdiction over all fish passing through their economic
zone, regardless of their migratory habits, while states with tuna
and other migratory fishery interests seek their regulation pursu-
ant to international agreement.30  Likewise, host states for anad-
romous species wish exclusive jurisdiction throughout their mi-
gratory cycle, while nations engaged in high seas salmon (and
other) fisheries want to retain freedom of fishing beyond an eco-
nomic zone. 31
c. Continental Shelf. Since the economic resource zone
concept would duplicate the continental shelf doctrine with regard
to coastal state competence over nonliving resources off its coast,
the only issue is whether that exclusive competence should extend
beyond 200 miles in cases where the physical continental shelf ex-
29 For some proposals on fishing rights, see U.N. )ocs. A/CONF.62/
C.2/L.40 (5 August 1974), L.47 (8 August 1974), and L.80 (23 August 1974).
30 For the United States position, particularly with respect to tuna, see U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.47 (8 August 1974).
31 On the anadromous species issue, see proposals contained in U.N.
Does. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.37 (5 August 1974), L.41 (5 August 1974), L.46 (8
August 1974), and L.81 (23 August 1974).
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tends beyond 200 miles. Self-interest and geological endowment
largely dictate the positions on this issue. 32
d. Navigation. Two major navigation issues are at stake in
the negotiations. First, the maritime powers insist on treaty
guarantees of free navigation within economic resource zones
(but without the territorial sea); developing nations agree with the
principle but argue that (under the "plurality of regimes" con-
cept) the determination of rights within the 200-mile zone is up to
the coastal state. Second, military and maritime powers seek a
regime of unimpeded transit through international straits. Straits
states are concerned that they be permitted to regulate that passage
in the interests of environmental protection and national security.
There appears to be a common agreement that merchant shipping
should be as little restricted as possible, but many developing
nations strongly oppose the idea of unimpeded transit for military
vessels, especially submerged nuclear submarines and overflight.
Proposals were introduced which would require advance notifica-
tion and coastal state permission for passage of warships through
international straits, a position completely unacceptable to the
major military powers. 33
e. Territorial Sea. Very little dispute exists on a 12-mile
breadth for the territorial sea, 34 provided that (i) developing coastal
states are assured of jurisdiction over living and non-living re-
sources in a broad area beyond 12 miles, and (ii) maritime powers
are assured of unimpeded navigation through straits which, though
possessing corridors of high seas under a 3-mile limit, would consist
entirely of territorial waters under a 12-mile limit.35
f. Archipelagos. Archipelago states wish a legal regime by
32 For various positions on the extent of coastal state mineral resource juris-
diction see U.N. Docs. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.25 (26 July 1974), L.28 (30 July 1974),
L.31 (30 July 1974), L.31/Rev.1 (16 August 1974), L.42 (6 August 1974), L.42/
Rev.1 (13 August 1974), L.47 (8 August 1974), L.74 (22 August 1974), and L.84
(26 August 1974).
33 For this and other proposals on straits, see U.N. Docs. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.3
(3 July 1974) [a comprehensive proposal by the United Kingdom], L.6 (10 July
1974), L,11 (17 July 1974) [a comprehensive proposal by the Soviet Union and
others], L.16 (22 July 1974), L.19 (23 July 1974) [a revision of a comprehensive
proposal submitted to the U.N. Seabed Committee by Fiji], L.20 (23 July 1974),
L.59 (14 August 1974), and L.83 (26 August 1974).
34 There are a few nations still advocating a 200 mile breadth for the territorial
sea. See, e.g., Ecuador's proposal in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.10 (16
July 1974).
35 For other territorial sea proposals, see U.N. Docs. A/CONF.62/C.2/
L.4 (9 July 1974), L.6 (10 July 1974), L.7 (12 July 1974), L.8 (15 July 1974), L.12
(17 July 1974), L.13 (18 July 1974), L.26 (29 July 1974), L.33 (31 July 1974).
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which, pursuant to some agreed formula, they could join the outer-
most points of their outermost islands by baselines from which the
other zones of ocean space jurisdiction would be measured.36
Since the area encompassed would in almost all cases fall within
their economic resource zone jurisdiction anyway (even if measured
from the individual islands), there is little argument over the re-
source aspects of this proposal. However, maritime powers object
to the potential for closing off traditionally used lanes of navigation,
particularly in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines area. Thus they
argue for a formula which will guarantee passage, either on a
general basis or in acceptable corridors.
g. Islands. A hotly contested issue, the question of islands
involves such sub-problems as: (i) should islands generate eco-
nomic resource zones in the same manner as mainland masses,
regardless of their size, population, or political status; (ii) should
islands forming colonial dependencies have the same rights to
offshore resources is independent nation islands; and (iii) should
islands be given full effect in applying equidistance or other formu-
las in the allocation of offshore areas between adjacent or opposite
states. By and large, geography determines the national positions
on most of these questions. 37
4. Third Committee. Chaired by Alexander Yankov (Bulgaria),
the Third Committee was the last of the main committees to adopt
its organizational program.38 The committee created two inform-
al groups, one dealing with pollution, the other with scientific re-
search, each of which heard general debate statements. 39  Sepa-
rate informal sessions were then conducted in an attempt to reduce
the treaty text alternatives and to negotiate the outstanding issues.
The informal session on pollution was chaired by Jose-Luis
Vallarta (Mexico) and the informal sessions on scientific research
by Cornel Metternich (Federal Republic of Germany). As with
the other main committees, however, there was virtually no prog-
36 For various archipelago positions, see U.N. Docs. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.24
(26 July 1974), L.49 (9 August 1974), L.51 (12 August 1974), L.52 (12 August
1974), L.63 (15 August 1974), L.64 (16 August 1974), L.67 (16 August 1974), L.70
(20 August 1974), and L.73 (22 August 1974).
37 For the disparate national positions on these questions, see U.N. Docs.
A/CONF.62/C.2/L.9 (15 July 1974), L.14 (19 July 1974), L.18 (23 July 1974),
L.22 (25 July 1974), L.23 (26 July 1974), L.30 (30 July 1974), L.34 (1 August
1974), L.43 (6 August 1974), L.50 (9 August 1974), L.53 (12 August 1974), L.55
(13 August 1974), L.58 (13 August 1974), L.62 (14 August 1974), and L.75 (22
August 1974).
38 U.N. Docs. A/CONF.62/C.3/SR.1-2 (4 July and 11 July 1974).
39 U.N. Docs. A/CONF.62/C.3/SR.3-9 (15 July through 19 July 1974).
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ress toward negotiating solutions to the issues involved in the
protection of the marine environment and oceanographic research
in the ocean. 40 Rather, the issues were drawn *more sharply into
focus and the groundwork laid for future negotiation. The major
issues in the two sub-areas may be summarized as follows.
a. Pollution.41 Among the more important issues discussed at
the Caracas session was the question of the creation of minimum
international standards for marine based activities in an economic
resource zone. The United States appears to have little support in
its quest for such standards - developing nations view it as an
imposition on their concept of coastal state "sovereignty" in the
economic zone, and some industrialized nations fear increased costs
as a result of high standards. For whatever reasons, the outlook for
such international standards in the zone is bleak.
Equally frustrating was the attempt to secure some general ob-
ligation to protect the marine environment. Even though there is
no real disagreement on the need for such a general obligation,
implementation in treaty language has run afoul of devleoping
countries' attempts to qualify the obligation by such language as
"best practicable means," "in accordance with their capabilities,"
and "in accordance with their national environmental policies."
Some view such language as undercutting the purpose of such an
obligation.
As to land-based sources of pollution, the Seabed Committee
and the Conference have taken the position that, as a general
proposition, the matter is beyond the competence of the law of the
sea negotiations and must be left essentially to the U.N. Environ-
ment Program.
With respect to vessel source pollution, there is a polarization
over whether enforcement ought to be by the coastal nation in
whose waters a violation of law takes place, or whether enforce-
ment should be by some combination of flag-state and port-state,
with coastal states authorized to act only in emergency situations.
40 For a summary statement of the work of the Third Committee, see U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.20 (23 August 1974). See also the summary of results
of the informal group on pollution in U.N. Docs. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.14-15 (22
August 1974) and the summary of results of the informal group on scientific re-
search in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.16 (23 August 1974).
41 Most of the proposals on this subject were contained in informal conference
room papers not a part of the official U.N. documentation for the Conference.
Reference should be made, if available, to "Third Committee, Informal Sessions
on Item 12, CRP/MP/1 to end of the series. Formal proposals were contained
in U.N. Docs. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.2 (23 July 1974), L.4 (23 July 1974), L.5
(29 July 1974), L.6 (31 July 1974), L.7 (1 August 1974), L.10 (6 August 1974),
and L.18 (23 August 1974).
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b. Scientific Research.42 As with so many other issues in-
volved in the law of the sea negotiations, the dispute over scienti-
fic research in the ocean is basically a developed-developing nation
controversy. Developed nations seek maximum freedom for the
conduct of oceanographic research in all parts of the ocean. De-
veloping coastal states seek to maximize their control over all
activities, including scientific research expeditions, in the waters
and seabed adjacent to their coast out to the limits of their resource
jurisdiction (which could be as far out as 200 miles under the eco-
nomic resource zone concept).43
The critical question concerns the conditions under which such
oceanographic research can be conducted within the economic zone
area. Proposals range from total freedom of access to a require-
ment of securing advance consent from the coastal state. 44 More
moderate positions would (i) require the expedition only to give
advance notice of its intention, consent to be implied unless word
is given to the contrary, and (ii) require compliance with inter-
nationally agreed obligations for the conduct of such research, in-
cluding open publication of results and the participation of repre-
sentatives of the coastal state if it so desired.
D. Special Negotiating Groups
Because of the obvious impracticability of negotiating the is-
sues among the 138 nations officially registered for the Caracas
session of the Conference, a number of smaller groups - both for-
mal and informal - were established or convened. Within the main
committees there were some informal meetings of smaller groups,
some by acquiescence of the committee at large and others simply
by reason of common interest.
There were, of course, regular meetings of the five regional
groups - Western European and Others, Eastern European, Afri-
can, Asian, and Latin American (the United States is not a
member of any regional group). All matters of organizational work
were cleared by the main committee chairmen with the designated
42 Most of the proposals on this subject were contained in informal conference
room papers not a part of the official U.N. documentation for the Conference.
Reference should be made, if available, to "Third Committee, informal Sessions
on Items 13 and 14, CRP/Sci. Res./1 to end of the series.
43 For proposals on this topic, as well as the issue of transfer of technology,
which is linked to the question of scientific research, see U.N. Docs.
A/CONF.62/C.3/L.3 (25 July 1974), L.8 (1 August 1974), L.9 (5 August 1974),
L.12 (22 August 1974), L.13 (22 August 1974), and L.19 (23 August 1974).
44 See the specific alternative in Part 11 of "Texts on Items 13 and 14," U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.17 (23 August 1974).
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representatives of the regional groups which in turn cleared the
proposals with the membership of their respective groups.
A number of functional groups were also established, including
the so-called "Group of 77" numbering over 100 developing
countries. There was a "coastal states group," the "Juridical Ex-
perts group," the "geographically disadvantaged" states, and a few
others, all of which attempted to negotiate compromise solutions.
However, none of these efforts resulted in any substantial degree of
agreement over the brord range of positions, most simply reflecting
the dominant position of those in the particular group. One p6s-
sible exception was the proposal submitted by the "coastal states
group" which attempted to reconcile some rather divergent
views. 45 By and large, however, the special groups did not appear
to produce the type of negotiating agreements sought by their
creation.
E. Conclusion of the Session
The session was completed on August 29, 1974. A subsequent
session in Geneva was scheduled for March 17-May 3, 1975. Near-
ly all delegations favored the earlier spring meeting, ostensibly for
the purpose of providing additional time later in the summer for
another session or, should the Geneva meeting be successful, for a
return to Caracas where the final documents would be signed.
Some nations indicated the necessity of continuing the Conference
beyond 1975, but this runs counter to the position of the United
States delegation that it may no longer object to domestic legisla-
tive initiatives in the areas of fishing, seabed mining, and perhaps
others after 1975. Thus, the fate of the Conference would seem
to hinge on the progress made at Geneva.
II. ANALYSIS
The following analysis does not purport to be a comprehensive
overview of the Caracas session of the Conference. Rather, it is
in part a distillation and summation of the views expressed by those
members of the Subcommittee who utilized Ford Foundation
grant funds to spend at least two weeks each in Caracas observing
the proceedings and serving as experts attached to the United
States delegation. It also reflects the observations of Subcommit-
tee members who did not participate in the grant supported acti-
vities but who nonetheless were in Caracas and indicated their
45 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.4 (26 July 1974).
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feelings on various issues to the rapporteur. The use of the term
"observers" in this section, then, refers only to those Subcom-
mittee members making some form (written or oral) of direct input
to the rapporteur for purposes of this report.
The section is broken up into two parts - the first deals with
the substantive issues at the international level; the second deals
with the United States delegation, its operation and its substantive
positions at the session.
A. Substantive Matters at the International Level
There is a consensus among observers that the Caracas session
was preparatory in nature and thus did not constitute a forum for
the negotiation of the outstanding issues. Given the size and
complexity of the Conference, the lack of participation by some
states in the work of the United Nations Seabed Committee, the
prospects for additional sessions in 1975 and perhaps beyond, the
logistical difficulties involved, and perhaps most importantly the
lack of preparation by a number of states, Caracas probably pro-
duced as much progress toward a law of the sea treaty as could be
expected, though that progress was minimal.
In spite of the modicum of successful preparatory work, how-
ever, a large conceptual gap still remains between developing
and developed countries on almost all issues. Caracas produced
no appreciable drawing together of the nations reflecting quite
diverse interests in and positions on the issues. It therefore ap-
pears to most observers that a successful treaty - that is, one which
deals with all law of the sea issues in a manner acceptable to the
vast majority of nations - is unlikely to emerge by the end of 1975.
One of the critical factors preventing progress toward a law
of the sea treaty was the physical size of the Conference and the
number and complexity of the issues involved. The impression
that a spectator might have of the Conference is that it resembled
a computer into which too much data had been fed and which had
been called upon to perform calculations beyond its capacity. In
addition to size and complexity, progress was also inhibited by
the difficulty of coordinating positions internally among the vari-
ous blocs at the session. This was particularly true of the so-
called "Group of 77," which numbers over 100 developing coun-
tries of quite diverse geographic, economic, and political situa-
tions.
Alternatives to the present system of seeking to negotiate a
comprehensive "package deal" encompassing all law of the sea
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matters appear to offer little hope of speeding up negotiations.
Both the approach of singling out issues for negotiation and seek-
ing general rather than specific agreements are unacceptable to
the developed countries which can achieve their non-resource
objectives only through the package approach and which are not
willing to accept general concepts such as the 200-mile economic
resource zone without a concommitant expression of the rights of
the international community and the duties of coastal states in
such zones.
There seems also to be a consensus that the current trend
toward a nationally oriented economic zone is shortsighted, and is
probably more a function of the decision-making forum than of a
thorough assessment of policy options. Given the complexity of
the issues and the inability of many nations to assess their long-
term impacts, there is a tendency to rely upon essentially short-
term economic considerations.
The trend toward the assertion of national jurisdiction over all
coastal resources, coupled with the voting power possessed by the
developing countries, could result in the adoption of a treaty which
would be, in whole or in part, unacceptable to the major maritime
powers. Most observers felt that this result would be worse than
a complete failure to reach any treaty agreement because it could
result in a polarization of the issues rather than leaving them open
for further development in the context of the process of customary
international law.
In this light, there was some support among observers for the
United States to proceed to unilateral action to preserve its in-
terests and to further the development of international law.
B. The United States Delegation
1. Procedural Matters. There was a common concern over the
operation of the delegation. The delegation was so large and na-
tional interests so diverse that at times there appeared to be a
"conference within a conference." It was also observed that al-
though the participation of the Advisory Committee reflects an
admirable openness on the part of the Government, better use of its
members might have been made in some instances. Some ob-
servers felt that they should have been more involved at the stage
of policy formulation.
2. Substantive Matters. There seemed to be a lack of support
for various positions of the United States during the Caracas ses-
sion. For example, an analysis of the positions expressed by the
[Vol. 8:13
CARACAS AND ITS AFTERMATH
115 delegations making general debate statements in the early
plenary sessions indicated limited support for United States posi-
tions on freedom of transit through international straits, full utiliza-
tion of living resources in the economic zone, freedom of scientific
research in the economic zone, adoption of international pollution
control standards with flag state enforcement, a licensing seabed
authority, and compulsory dispute settlement.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
FURTHER RESEARCH
Recommendations by grant recipients were submitted in two
areas, for example, research useful to the negotiators on an inter-
session basis, and research useful in the event that the Conference
fails in one way or another to produce a universal, comprehensive
law of the sea treaty.
A. Recommended Intersessional Research
1. Conditions for Full Utilization of Living Resources in the Eco-
nomic Zone. The full utilization principle raises a number of issues
on which there have been to date few studies. First is the de-
termination of "optimal yield," or whatever the limiting figure
for total annual allowable catch is based upon. Critics of the full
utilization concept can certainly claim that little basis at present
exists for determining any such limit except the maximum sustain-
able yield concept. Attention should also be given to criteria for
setting priorities for harvesting the unutilized stocks by foreign
fishermen. What role would joint-venture companies play?
How will enforcement costs be allocated? Should general rules
be adopted to take care of countries with historic fishing rights,
of countries within the regional group, of states with heavy in-
vestments in fishing capacity, but with limited fisheries resources
in their own economic zone? What provisions might be made
for land-locked and other geographically-disadvantaged states
both within and beyond the region?
2. Groupings of States According to Common Interests. One of
the difficulties of any decision matrix for LOS III is clearly the
great variety of overlapping interests of the nearly 150 states in
attendance. Matrices might be prepared indicating "member-
ship" in various interest groups, and commonalities of the "mem-
bership" in such groups.
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3. Archipelagos. Despite considerable work carried out by
the State Department, there still is room for considerable analysis
of archipelagos, of possible sealanes through archipelagic waters,
and of alternative regimes for passage. These issues should be
addressed not only to archipelagic states, but also to mainland
states with coastal archipelagos, and to archipelagos some distance
removed from the mainland state which has jurisdiction over
them.
4. Seabed Regime. Research should be undertaken on the
questions of (a) the nature of mutually satisfactory arrangements
between the authority and private companies for joint ventures
with appropriate profit sharing (consideration of the Production
Sharing Contracts between private companies and the Indonesian
government and other existing production or profit sharing prece-
dent would be appropriate), and (b) the nature of decision-making
arrangements in the authority to take adequate account of the spe-
cial interests and responsibilities of the major maritime and tech-
nologically advanced countries.
5. The Rights of Coastal States to Prescribe and Enforce En-
vironmental Standards in the Economic Zone. It would seem useful to
examine whether any adjustment might be appropriate in the U.S.
position with respect to (a) coastal state enforcement of interna-
tional standards, (b) coastal state rights to prescribe discharge
standards higher than the international standards, and (c) special
arrangements for ecologically vulnerable areas like the Canadian
Arctic, where special international construction standards could be
established, or, alternatively, the country concerned could establish
interim construction standards subject to disapproval by IMCO.
6. Legal Problems Arising out of Cables and Pipelines. Subma-
rine cables and pipelines give rise to a multitude of problems -
pollution, safety standards, interference with other uses, differing
legal treatment depending on whether the cable or pipeline comes
ashore in a particular state or merely passes through the territorial
sea or 200-mile economic zone of a state, and so forth.
7. Mechanisms for Facilitating Work of International Ocean In-
stitutions (IMCO, IOC, FAO and Regional Fisheries Organizations).
Research could define objectives of ocean resource management;
evaluate and compare decision-making machinery for manage-
ment and enforcement; assess and compare existing data collect-
ing and processing systems and the adequacy of scientific input
into management decisions; examine existing and potential liaison
and coordination to accommodate multiple uses; and review pro-
cedures for compulsory settlement of disputes.
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8. Composition and Membership of an International Seabed Execu-
tive Organ: Explore and Compare Alternatives, Models from Other
Areas. With respect to fishery institutions, examine (a) regional
fishery agreements, (b) user fishery agreements, (c) bilateral
fishery agreements, and (d) FAO. Research capabilities required
to enable fishery organizations to recommend (a) total allowable
catch for each species and (b) annual allowable catch for states
entitled to fish in an area. Further, research nature of politically
acceptable controls on and regulation of marine pollution: (a)
type of international decision making body; and (b) areas of juris-
diction (vessel size, cargoes, means of propulsion, training of
crews, insurance provisions).
B. Conference Research
1. The Nature and Rights of Geographically-Disadvantaged States.
During the Caracas session many references were made to the
existence of geographically-disadvantaged states, and to the need
for "compensations" for such countries. Efforts should be made
to assess the conditions of "disadvantage," the alternative com-
pensations these states might receive, and the approximate costs
of such compensations to other states. Sharing these costs may
prove to be one of the most contentious issues of post-Conference
developments.
2. Boundaries of the Economic Zone, Two problems exist here.
First are the bases for delimiting economic zones. What distinc-
tions should be made among islands, rocks, etc.? Should there be
a difference between independent and dependent areas so far as
their use for basepoints is concerned? Second is the question of
boundaries between opposite and adjacent zones. There has been
trouble enough with respect to boundaries of the territorial sea and
continental shelves; these troubles will be exacerbated with the
establishment of 200-mile economic zones. Should there be a
Committee of Experts and dispute-settlement machinery to handle
such boundary problems?
3. Multi-Regional Arrangements. At the Caracas session ref-
erence was frequently made to the need for regional arrangements.
These might be either of two types. First are mutual-benefit
arrangements, such as in semi-enclosed seas, where littoral coun-
tries band together for pollution control, fisheries conservation,
or other matters of common interest. Second are the "compensa-
tory" arrangements, such as access to the sea for land-locked
states, and sharing in resource development of neighbors' eco-
1976]
32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. [Vol. 8:13
nomic zones with a regional framework. The criteria for such
regional arrangements, and the parameters within which they
should be established, are issues for which additional study is
necessary.
